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In this paper, we construct an equilibrium model of directed search in a large
labor market in which unemployed workers make multiple job applications.
Speciﬁcally, we consider a matching process in which job seekers, observing
the wages posted at all vacancies, send their applications to the vacancies
that they ﬁnd most attractive. At the same time, each vacancy, when it
chooses its wage posting, takes into account that its posted wage inﬂuences
the number of applicants it can expect to attract. We assume that each
unemployed worker makes a ﬁxed number of applications, a. Each vacancy
(among those receiving applications) then chooses one applicant to whom it
oﬀers its job. When a>1, there is a possibility that more than one vacancy
wants to hire the same worker. In this case, we assume that the vacancies in
question can compete for this worker’s services. The introduction of multiple
applications adds realism to the directed search model, and, in addition, af-
fects the eﬃciency properties of equilibrium. In the benchmark competitive
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1search equilibrium model (Moen 1997), equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient.
We show that changing the basic directed search model to allow workers to
make more than one application results in equilibria that are not constrained
eﬃcient. This means there is a role for labor market policy in the directed
search framework.
When a =1 , our model is essentially the limiting version of Burdett, Shi,
and Wright (2001) (hereafter BSW) translated to a labor market setting.
BSW derive a unique symmetric equilibrium in which (in the labor market
version) all vacancies post a wage between zero (the monopsony wage) and
one (the competitive wage). The value of this common posted wage depends
on the number of unemployed, u, and the number of vacancies, v, in the
market. Letting u,v →∞with v/u = θ, the equilibrium posted wage is an
increasing function of θ. BSW do not consider normative questions. Moen’s
result is that in a large labor market, directed search implements what
he calls competitive search equilibrium. Competitive search equilibrium
is constrained eﬃcient in the following sense. Assume there is a cost per
vacancy created. A social planner would choose a level of vacancy creation
— or, in a large labor market, a level of labor market tightness, θ, —t ot r a d e
oﬀ the cost of vacancy creation against the beneﬁt of making it easier for
workers to match. Moen shows that the θ the social planner would choose
is the same as the one that arises in competitive search equilibrium. Using
a diﬀerent approach, we also show that equilibrium in a directed search
model is constrained eﬃcient in a large labor market when a =1 . More
importantly, however, we show that if each worker makes a ﬁnite number
of multiple applications, that is, if a ∈{ 2,...,A}, where A is any arbitrary,
ﬁnite integer, then equilibrium in a directed search model is not constrained
eﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, too many vacancies are posted (θ is too high) in free-
entry equilibrium relative to the constrained eﬃcient level. Equivalently,
v a c a n c i e sp a yt h ew o r k e r sw h ot a k et h e i rj o b st o ol o waw a g eo na v e r a g e .
Our model is also related to Julien, Kennes, and King (2000) (hereafter
JKK). JKK assume that each unemployed worker posts a minimum wage
at which he or she is willing to work, i.e., a “reserve wage,” and that each
vacancy, observing all posted reserve wages, then makes an oﬀer to one
worker. If more than one vacancy wants to hire the same worker, then, as
in our model, there is ex post competition for that worker’s services. This
is equivalent to a model in which each worker applies to every vacancy, i.e.,
a = v, sending the same reserve wage in each application. Each vacancy
then chooses one worker at random to whom it oﬀers a job. If a worker
has more than one oﬀer, then there is competition for his or her services.
In a ﬁnite labor market, JKK show that the unique, symmetric equilibrium
2reserve wage lies between the monopsony and competitive levels. There is
thus equilibrium wage dispersion in their model. Those workers who receive
only one oﬀer are employed at the reserve wage, while those who receive
multiple oﬀers are employed at the competitive wage. In the limiting labor
market version of JKK, the symmetric equilibrium reserve wage converges
to zero, and free-entry equilibrium is again constrained eﬃcient.
In our model, when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, all vacancies post the monopsony wage
in the unique symmetric equilibrium. As in JKK, this leads to equilibrium
wage dispersion. Some workers (those who receive exactly one oﬀer) are
employed at the monopsony wage, and some workers (those who receive
multiple oﬀers) have their wages bid up to the competitive level. The key
diﬀerence between our model and both BSW and JKK, however, is that
free-entry equilibrium is ineﬃcient. When a ∈{ 2,...,A}, there is excessive
vacancy creation.
The ineﬃciency arises because when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, two coordination
frictions operate simultaneously. The ﬁrst is the well-known urn-ball friction;
some vacancies receive no applications while others receive more than one.
In addition, a new friction is introduced by multiple applications. Some
workers receive multiple oﬀers while others receive none. As a result, some
vacancies with applicants fail to hire a worker. In BSW, only the urn-ball
friction is present; in JKK, only the multiple-application friction applies.
T h em a r k e tc a n n o tc o r r e c tb o t hf r i c t i o n sa tt h es a m et i m e .I no u rm o d e l ,
competition among vacancies, once applications have been made, can solve
the multiple-application friction. This leads, however, to a posted wage that
is too low to correct the urn-ball friction and that consequently generates
too many vacancies.
The outline of the rest of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we
derive our basic positive results in a single-period framework. Speciﬁcally,
treating θ as given, we derive the matching function and the symmetric
equilibrium posted wage. In Section 3, we endogenize θ by allowing for free
entry of vacancies. This lets us compare the free-entry equilibrium level
of θ to the constrained eﬃcient level (the two values of θ are the same
when a =1 , diﬀerent when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, and the same once again as
a →∞ ). In Section 4, we present a steady-state version of our model for
t h ec a s eo fa ∈{ 2,..,A}. The key to the steady-state analysis is that a
worker who receives only one oﬀer in the current period has the option to
reject that oﬀer in favor of waiting for a future period in which more than one
vacancy bids for his or her services. This leads to a tractable model in which
labor market tightness and the equilibrium wage distribution are determined
simultaneously. The normative results that we derived in the single-period
3model continue to hold in the steady-state setting. In Section 5, we consider
three extensions. Speciﬁcally, (i) we allow workers to choose how many
applications to make, (ii) we relax the assumption that each vacancy can
consider only one worker’s application, and (iii) we allow vacancies to follow
strategies that rule out Bertrand competition. These extensions, while of
interest in their own right, also serve as robustness checks — our basic result
that the free-entry equilibrium value of θ is constrained ineﬃcient when
a ∈{ 2,...,A} continues to hold. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.
2 The Basic Model
We consider a game played by u homogeneous unemployed workers and (the
owners of) v homogeneous vacancies. This game has several stages:
1. Each vacancy posts a wage.
2. Each unemployed worker observes all posted wages and then submits
a applications with no more than one application going to any one
vacancy.
3. Each vacancy that receives at least 1 application randomly selects one
to process. Any excess applications are returned as rejections.
4. A vacancy with a processed application oﬀers the applicant the posted
wage. If more than one vacancy makes an oﬀer to a particular worker,
then each vacancy can increase its bid for that worker’s services.
5. A worker with one oﬀer can accept or reject that oﬀer. A worker with
more than one oﬀer can accept one of the oﬀers or reject all of them.
Workers who fail to match with a vacancy and vacancies that fail to match
with a worker receive payoﬀs of zero. The payoﬀ for a worker who matches
with a vacancy is w, where w is the wage that he or she is paid. A vacancy
that hires a worker at a wage of w receives a payoﬀ of 1−w. This is a model
of directed search in the sense that workers observe all wage postings and
direct their applications to vacancies with attractive wages and/or where
relatively little competition is expected. We assume that vacancies cannot
pay less than their posted wages.
Before we analyze this game, some comments on the underlying assump-
tions are in order. First, we are treating a as a parameter of the search
technology; that is, the number of applications is taken as given. In general,
4a ∈{ 1,2,...,A}. Second, we assume that it takes a period for a vacancy to
process an application. This is why vacancies return excess applications as
rejections. This processing-time assumption captures the idea that when
workers apply for several jobs at the same time, ﬁrms can waste time and
eﬀort pursuing applicants who ultimately go elsewhere. Finally, we assume
that a vacancy that faces competition for its selected applicant always has
the option to increase its oﬀer. This means that workers who receive more
than one oﬀer have their wages bid up via Bertrand competition to w =1 ,
the competitive wage.1 In Section 5, we consider the implications of relaxing
each of these assumptions. We show that endogenizing a, allowing vacan-
cies to process more than one application, and allowing vacancies that are
competing for an applicant to pursue a diﬀerent tie-breaking strategy do not
reverse our main results.
We consider symmetric equilibria in which all vacancies post the same
wage and all workers use the same mixed strategy to direct their applica-
tions.2 We do not consider equilibria in which workers follow asymmetric
application strategies since this would require unrealistic implicit coordina-
tion. We do our analysis in a large labor market in which we let u,v →∞
with v/u = θ keeping a ∈{ 1,2,...,A} ﬁxed. We show that for each (θ,a)
combination there is a unique symmetric equilibrium, and we derive the cor-
responding equilibrium matching probability and posted wage. Assuming
(for the moment) the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we begin with
the matching probability.
1One might think of ruling out ex post bidding by assumption, but then there would
be no common equilibrium posted wage. To see this, suppose all vacancies post a wage
of w. Then, assuming that a worker who has multiple oﬀers accepts the highest one, it
is in the interest of any vacancy to post a slightly higher wage so long as w is not too
close to one. The reason is that if a vacancy posts a wage ε above the common wage, its
probability of hiring a worker jumps discontinuously since it “wins” whenver the worker
has multiple ofers. Once w is suﬃciently close to one, a vacancy can proﬁt by lowering its
wage to the minimum level consistent with attracting one or more applicants with some
positive probability. This is similar to the argument given in Burdett and Judd (1983) for
nonexistence of a single-price equilibrium.
2One could alternatively consider symmetric equilibria in which vacancies follow mixed
strategies, so that more than one wage is posted in equilibrium. This approach is taken in
Galenianos and Kircher (2005), which combines elements of our paper and that of Chade
and Smith (2004). In Galenianos and Kircher (2005), a vacancy whose chosen applicant
has other oﬀer(s) is precluded by assumption from increasing its initial oﬀer, even though
it would be in its interest to do so, given that other vacancies have committed to not
changing their oﬀers. The assumption that vacancies cannot engage in ex post bidding
is restrictive, but without it, equilibrium in Galenianos and Kircher (2005) would not be
subgame perfect.
5Let M(u,v;a) be the expected number of matches in a labor market with
u unemployed workers and v v a c a n c i e sw h e ne a c hu n e m p l o y e dw o r k e rs u b -





probability for an unemployed worker in a large labor market.
Proposition 1 Let u,v →∞with v/u = θ and a ∈{ 1,...,A} ﬁxed. The




(1 − e−a/θ))a. (1)
The proof is given in Albrecht et. al. (2004); see also Philip (2003).
In Appendix A, we sketch the idea of the proof to clarify the relationship
between our matching probability and the ﬁnite-market matching functions
presented in BSW (the standard urn-ball matching function) and JKK (the
urn-ball matching function with the roles of u and v reversed).
For use below, we note the following properties of m(θ;a):
(i) m(θ;a) is increasing and concave in θ,
lim
θ→0
















The eﬀect of a on m(θ;a) is less clearcut. Treating a as a continuous









(1 − e−a/θ) is the probability that any one application leads to an
oﬀer. For moderately large values of θ (θ>1
2, approximately), m(θ;a)
ﬁrst increases and then decreases with a. This nonmonotonicity reﬂects the
double coordination problem that arises when workers apply to more than
one but not all vacancies. The ﬁrst coordination problem is the standard
one associated with urn-ball matching, namely, that some vacancies can




is not convex in θ, as can be seen immediately by considering
the case of a =1 . The properties of m(θ;a) and
m(θ;a)
θ
g i v e ni n( i )a n d( i i )a r et h e
minimal ones required for our normative results in Sections 3 and 4 below.
6With multiple applications, there is a second coordination problem, this
time among vacancies. When workers apply for more than one job at a
time, some workers can receive oﬀers from more than one vacancy, while
others receive none. Ultimately, a worker can only take one job, and the
vacancies that “lose the race” for a worker will have wasted time and eﬀort
while considering his or her application. The matching function derived
in BSW captures only the urn-ball friction, while the one derived in JKK
captures only the multiple-application friction. Our matching probability
incorporates both these frictions, and the interaction between these two
frictions provides new insights.
Proposition 1 and its implications are only interesting if a symmetric
equilibrium exists. We now turn to the existence question.
Proposition 2 Consider a large labor market in which u,v →∞with
v/u = θ. There is a unique symmetric equilibrium to the wage-posting game.






When a ∈{ 2,...,A}, all vacancies post a wage of w(θ;a)=0 , and the
fraction of wages paid that are equal to one is
γ(θ;a)=
1 − (1 − θ
a(1 −e−a/θ))a − θ(1 − e−a/θ)(1 − θ
a(1 − e−a/θ))a−1
1 − (1 − θ
a(1 − e−a/θ))a .
(3)
The proof is given in Appendix B. The basic idea is as follows. To
prove the existence of a symmetric equilibrium, we show that w(θ;1) has
the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception of a “potential
deviant,” post that wage, then it is also in the interest of the deviant to
post that wage. When a ∈{ 2,...,A}, however, no matter what the common
wage posted by other vacancies, it is always in the interest of the deviant to
undercut that common wage. This forces the wage down to the monopsony
level, which in our single-period model is w =0 .
The equilibrium wage for the case of a =1is equal to one minus the
price given in Proposition 3 in BSW — again with the appropriate notational
change. The tradeoﬀ that leads to a well-behaved equilibrium wage, w ∈
(0,1), when a =1is the standard one in equilibrium search theory. To see
this, note that the proﬁt for a deviant (D) from oﬀering w￿ rather than the
c o m m o np o s t e dw a g e ,w, can be written as:
π(w￿;w)=( 1 −w￿)P[D gets at least one application]P[selected applicant has no other oﬀer],
7where the third term equals 1 when a =1 . As any particular vacancy
increases its posted wage, holding the wages posted at other vacancies con-
stant, the proﬁt that this vacancy generates conditional on attracting an
applicant, (1 − w￿), decreases. At the same time, however, the probabil-
ity that it attracts at least one applicant increases. This tradeoﬀ varies
smoothly with θ; so the equilibrium wage varies smoothly between zero and
one. Thus, as emphasized in BSW (p. 1069), there is a sense in which
frictions “smooth” the operation of the labor market.
When a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the posted wage collapses to the monopsony level
(as in Diamond (1971)). The intuition for this result is based on the change
in the tradeoﬀ underlying equilibrium wage determination. This change —
to be described below — has two implications. First, the equilibrium wage is
lower than when a =1 . Second, when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the lower is the putative
common equilibrium wage w, the stronger is the incentive to deviate by
posting w￿ <w . This second implication is what drives the wage down to
the monopsony level.
Why is the equilibrium wage lower when workers make more than one
application? Note ﬁrst that the incentive to deviate from a common posted
wage w comes from the ﬁrst two terms in π(w￿;w) since the third term is
unaﬀected by changes in w￿ when the labor market is large. That is, the
incentive to deviate comes from the eﬀect of w￿ on 1−w￿ and on the proba-
bility that the deviant receives at least one application. The eﬀect of oﬀering
w￿ on 1 − w￿ is obviously the same whether workers make one or multiple
applications. However, a deviation has less eﬀect on the probability that
the deviant gets at least one applicant when workers make multiple appli-
cations. Consider a deviation w￿ >w .The higher wage makes the vacancy
more attractive to a worker if w  is the only oﬀer received. However, when
a ∈{ 2,...,A}, workers have an interest in getting multiple oﬀers in order
to generate Bertrand competition for their services, and since the deviant
vacancy is more attractive to all workers, applying to the deviant decreases
the probability that this occurs. Thus, a deviation w  >wincreases the
p r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h ed e v i a n tr e c e i v e sa tl e a s to n ea p p l i c a t i o nb yl e s sw h e n
workers make multiple applications than when a =1 . Similarly, a deviation
w  <wd e c r e a s e st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h ed e v i a n tr e c e i v e sa tl e a s to n ea p -
p l i c a t i o nb yl e s st h a nw h e na =1 . In this case, a worker who applies to the
d e v i a n tg e t sal o w e rw a g ei ft h i si st h eo n l yo ﬀ e rr e c e i v e d . J u s ta sw h e n
a =1 , this makes the deviant less attractive. However, when a ∈{ 2,...,A},
to increase the chance of getting multiple oﬀers, workers have an incentive
to apply to a “safe” job where others are less likely to apply. Relative to the
case of a =1 , this reduces the decrease in the probability that the deviant
8attracts at least one applicant. The fact that upward deviations are less
attractive and downward deviations are more attractive explains why the
equilibrium wage is lower when a ∈{ 2,...,A} than when a =1 .
Why does the equilibrium wage fall to the monopsony level when workers
make multiple applications? The potential beneﬁt to a deviant of posting
aw a g et h a ti sε below a common wage w is the same for all w, but the
cost in terms of the reduction in the probability of receiving at least one
application falls as the common wage falls. The probability that the deviant
receives at least one application depends on the chance that workers are
willing to take to try to generate multiple oﬀers. The closer w is to zero,
the greater is the beneﬁt to a worker of receiving multiple oﬀers; i.e., the
greater is the diﬀerence between the competitive wage and w.T h u s , t h e
incentive for workers to apply to a vacancy oﬀering ε below the common
wage, w, rises as w falls, and the probability that a vacancy oﬀering ε less
than w receives at least one application rises as w falls. Thus, as w falls,
the potential beneﬁt of a downward deviation is constant, but the cost of
such a deviation decreases. This is what drives the common wage to the
monopsony level.
Interestingly, when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the equilibrium outcome in our di-
rected search model is the same as the outcome one would ﬁnd in a random
search model in which workers make multiple applications and vacancies
engage in Bertrand competition when their candidates have multiple oﬀers.
If workers do not observe posted wages, they apply at random to a va-
cancies in symmetric equilibrium, and the matching rate is the same as in
our model. In addition, vacancies pay the monopsony wage in this random
search model, unless a worker has multiple oﬀers, in which case Bertrand
competition drives the wage to the competitive level. Thus, allowing for
multiple applications in our model erases the diﬀerence between directed
a n dr a n d o ms e a r c hi nt e r m so fo u t c o m e si nc o n t r a s tt ot h ec a s eo fa =1 .
To the best of our knowledge, no random search model with multiple appli-
cations and Bertrand competition exists in the literature, but it would be
straightforward to construct such a model. Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is
the most closely related model. In their model, wage oﬀers arrive at Poisson
rates to both the unemployed and the employed. If a worker who is already
employed receives another oﬀer, then that worker’s current employer and
prospective new employer engage in Bertrand competition for his or her ser-
vices. In the homogeneous worker/homogeneous ﬁrm version of their model,
this leads to a two-point distribution of wages paid, namely, the monopsony
wage and the competitive wage, as in our model.
9Finally, despite the fact that the posted equilibrium wage in our model
is zero when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, there is still a sense in which “the wage” varies
smoothly with θ. The expected fraction of wages paid that are equal to one,
γ(θ;a), has the following properties:






The fact that γ is increasing in θ is exactly as one would expect — as the
labor market gets tighter, the chance that an individual worker gets multiple
oﬀers increases. To understand why γ is also increasing in a, it is important
to remember that γ(θ;a) is the expected wage for those workers who match
with a vacancy; in particular, those workers who fail to match are not treated
as receiving a wage of zero. Finally, deﬁning γ(θ)= l i m
a→∞γ(θ;a), we can show
γ(θ)=
1 − e−θ − θe−θ
1 − e−θ . (4)
T h i si st h ee x p e c t e dw a g ei nal a r g el a b o rm a r k e tw h e ne a c hw o r k e rs e n d s
out an arbitrarily large number of applications.
3E ﬃ c i e n c y
We now turn to the question of constrained eﬃciency. The result suggested
by the eﬃciency of competitive search equilibrium holds in our setting when
a =1 ;however, when workers make a ﬁxed number of multiple applications,
this result breaks down.
Suppose vacancies are set up at the beginning of the period and that each
vacancy is created at cost cv. The eﬃcient level of labor market tightness4




The ﬁrst-order condition for this maximization is
cv = mθ(θ∗;a). (5)
4In a ﬁnite labor market with u given, the social planner chooses v to maximize
M(u,v;a) − cv, i.e., expected output (equal to the expected number of matches since
each match produces an output of 1) minus the vacancy creation costs. Dividing the
maximand by u and letting u,v →∞ with v/u = θ gives the maximand in the text.
10The equilibrium level of labor market tightness is determined by free entry.
When a =1 , this means
cv =
m(θ∗∗;1)
θ∗∗ (1 − w(θ∗∗;1)), (6)
whereas for a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the condition is
cv =
m(θ∗∗;a)
θ∗∗ (1 − γ(θ∗∗;a)). (7)
Equations (6) and (7) reﬂect the condition that entry (vacancy creation)
occurs up to the point that the cost of vacancy creation is just oﬀset by
the value of owning a vacancy. This value equals the probability of hiring
a worker times the expected surplus generated by a hire — equal to 1 minus
the posted wage when a =1and to 1 minus the expected wage when a ∈
{2,...,A}.
Note that θ∗ denotes the constrained eﬃcient level of labor market tight-
ness and θ∗∗ denotes the equilibrium level of labor market tightness. At issue
is the relationship between θ∗ and θ∗∗.
Proposition 3 Let u,v →∞with v/u = θ and a ∈{ 1,...,A} ﬁxed. For
a =1 ,θ ∗ = θ∗∗. For a ∈{ 2,...,A}, θ∗∗ >θ ∗.















Using equations (1) and (2) in equation (6) gives an implicit expression for
θ∗∗,
m(θ∗∗;1)





Thus, equations (5) and (6) imply θ∗ = θ∗∗ when a =1 .


















The right-hand sides of both (9) and (10) are decreasing in θ. Since the
right-hand side of (10) is greater than that of (9) for all θ>0, it follows
that θ∗∗ >θ ∗.
Posting a vacancy has the standard congestion and thick-market eﬀects
in our model — adding one more vacancy makes it more diﬃcult for the in-
cumbent vacancies to ﬁnd workers but makes it easier for the unemployed to
generate oﬀers. A striking result of the competitive search equilibrium lit-
erature is that adding one more vacancy causes the wage to adjust in such a
way as to balance these external eﬀects correctly. One way to interpret this
result is that competition leads to a wage that satisﬁes the Hosios (1990)
condition in a Nash bargaining model. Equivalently, one can say (Moen,
1997, p. 387) that the competitive search equilibrium wage has the prop-
erty that the marginal rate of substitution between labor market tightness
and the wage is the same for vacancies as for workers. The ﬁrst part of
Proposition 3 shows that this result holds when one uses an explicit urn-ball
(a =1 ) microfoundation for the matching function. When workers make
multiple applications, however, the result that θ∗∗ >θ ∗ i n d i c a t e st h a tt h e
equilibrium level of vacancy creation is too high. Equivalently, the equilib-
rium expected wage is below the level that would be indicated by the Hosios
condition.
A ﬁrst intuition for why we ﬁnd constrained eﬃciency with a =1but not
with a ﬁxed, ﬁnite number of multiple applications is that with a =1 , only
one coordination problem aﬀects the operation of the labor market, whereas
with a ﬁxed a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the urn-ball and the multiple-applications coor-
dination problems operate simultaneously. Adding a vacancy increases the
number of matches by reducing the ﬁrst coordination friction, the one that
workers impose on each other, but at the same time increases the second co-
ordination friction, the one that vacancies impose on each other. When each
worker applies to only one vacancy, the second friction is absent, but with
multiple applications there are two coordination problems that cannot be
solved simultaneously. This intuition does not, however, address the ques-
tion of why there is too much vacancy creation, as opposed to not enough.
Accordingly, we now give a more detailed explanation of our ineﬃciency
result.
The social planner opens vacancies as long as the marginal social beneﬁt
exceeds cv, w h i l et h em a r k e to p e n sv a c a n c i e sa sl o n ga st h em a r g i n a l( =
12average) private beneﬁt exceeds cv.W h e na =1 , the private beneﬁt of a new
vacancy equals the social beneﬁt. When a ∈{ 2,...,A}, the private beneﬁt
exceeds the social beneﬁt. The social beneﬁt of a new vacancy is simply
mθ(θ;a); the private beneﬁt is
m(θ;a)
θ
(1−γ(θ;a)). The key to understanding
the discrepancy between the private and social beneﬁts of a new vacancy




(1 − γ(θ;a))p(θ;a). (11)
where
• m(θ;a)/θ is the probability that a vacancy receives at least one appli-
cation
• 1−γ(θ;a) is the probability that the worker who has been oﬀered the
job has no other oﬀers
• p(θ;a)=
1 −e−a/θ − a
θe−a/θ
1 − e−a/θ is the probability that a vacancy receives
two or more applications conditional on receiving at least one.
One can derive equation (11) by diﬀerentiating m(θ;a), b u tt h i se x -
pression can also be derived using a straightforward economic argument. A
vacancy has value to the social planner if it leads to an otherwise idle worker




is ﬁlled and produces one unit of output. However, with probability γ(θ;a),
the worker who matches with the vacancy also receives another oﬀer. In this
case, the social beneﬁt of the vacancy is zero; if it had not been opened, the
number of matches would have been the same. The private beneﬁt in this
case is also zero — a vacancy receives nothing if it makes its oﬀer to a worker
who has other oﬀer(s) since the wage is bid up to the competitive level.
Social and private incentives are thus aligned with respect to the ﬁrst two
terms on the right-hand side of equation (11). The social planner considers
an additional factor, which is given by p(θ;a). Consider the creation of a
new vacancy. If p(θ;a)=0 , then all vacancies have at most one applicant.
Opening a new vacancy creates no social beneﬁt because any applicant that
it might attract would leave another vacancy unﬁlled. On the other hand, if
p(θ;a)=1 , a new vacancy, if it is ﬁlled, does not leave another vacancy with
no applicants. In general, the lower is p(θ;a), t h em o r el i k e l yi ti st h a tan e w
13v a c a n c yw i l lc a u s ea ni n c u m b e n tv a c a n c yt of a i lt oa t t r a c ta n ya p p l i c a n t s
and hence the lower the social beneﬁt.
To further understand our ineﬃciency result, we ask what wage, w∗,
should have been posted in the ﬁrst stage of the game in order to achieve
eﬃciency? In other words, if the social planner could only determine the










When a =1 , w∗ equals the posted wage given in equation (2) in Proposition
2. The fact that the posted wage is zero when a ∈{ 2,...,A} is what leads to
an ineﬃcient outcome. The ineﬃciency problem when workers make multi-
ple applications could thus be solved by an appropriately chosen minimum
wage.
According to the Hosios condition, eﬃciency requires that the expected
private beneﬁt of opening a vacancy equals the marginal contribution of
that vacancy to the matching process and that the expected wage equals the
worker’s marginal contribution to the matching process. The eﬃcient wage
w∗ equals the probability that a vacancy receives exactly one application
conditional on receiving at least one. This conditional probability is the
marginal contribution of a worker to the matching process because output
is only increased if the worker applies to a vacancy with no other applicants.
When workers apply to more than one vacancy and there is ex post Bertrand
competition among vacancies, workers apply to vacancies even if they post a
zero wage, and vacancies receive more surplus than their contribution to the
matching process warrants. This is why there is excessive vacancy creation
in equilibrium.
It is interesting to note that the equilibrium outcome is again Pareto






1 − e−θ − θe−θ
1 − e−θ
and substitute these into the eﬃciency and equilibrium conditions as in
the proof of Proposition 3. Alternatively, following the route suggested by
14equation (11), note that as a →∞ ,p (θ;a) → 1, thus aligning the social and
private beneﬁts of vacancy creation.5 This result is Proposition 2.5 in JKK.
In a companion paper, Julien, Kennes, and King (2006) show that equi-
librium in a ﬁnite labor market with a = v is also constrained eﬃcient if
one assumes a particular wage determination mechanism; namely, vacancies
oﬀering jobs to workers who have no other oﬀers receive all of the surplus
(w =0 ) but vacancies oﬀering jobs to workers who do have other oﬀers re-
c e i v en o n eo ft h es u r p l u s( w =1 ). Julien, Kennes, and King (2006) interpret
this result in terms of what they call the Mortensen rule (Mortensen 1982)
— that eﬃciency in matching is attained if the “initiator” of the match gets
the total surplus. By mimicking our proof of Proposition 2, we can show
that this assumed wage determination mechanism is in fact the symmetric
equilibrium outcome in a directed search model with wage posting when
a = v in a ﬁnite labor market.6
Could an adaptation of the Julien, Kennes, and King (2006) wage deter-
mination mechanism to a large labor market with a ∈{ 2,...,A} deliver the
constrained eﬃcient outcome? In order to do this, we would have to assume
that a worker receives w =1if he or she (i) has multiple oﬀers or (ii) has
only one oﬀer and is the only applicant to the vacancy making that oﬀer but
receives w =0if he or she has only one oﬀer but the vacancy making that
oﬀer has other applicants. The extra twist in the mechanism (setting w =1
in case (ii) above) is required because p(θ;a) < 1 when a  = v. This mecha-
nism delivers an expected payoﬀ to vacancy creation equal to the right-hand
side of equation (11); thus, it implements the constrained eﬃcient outcome.
We argue, however, that this wage determination protocol cannot be
sustained as an equilibrium outcome in a large labor market. One reason
is that it requires that when a worker is the sole applicant for a job, the
vacancy has to reveal this, even though it is not in the vacancy’s interest to
5The fact that the social planner cannot improve on the equilibrium outcome in this
case does not mean that welfare increases as a →∞ . To the contrary, γ(θ;a) increases
and m(θ;a) decreases in a as a →∞ . Increasing a makes the planner’s problem more
diﬃcult. Similarly, even though equilibrium is constrained eﬃcient when a =1 , welfare
may increase by moving to a>1.
6The intuition for constrained eﬃciency in a large labor market when a =1is quite
diﬀerent from the intuition for the ﬁnite labor market case when a = v. In the former,
constrained eﬃciency is a result of competition, and competition requires a labor market
suﬃciently large that individual vacancies have negligible market power. When a = v,
constrained eﬃciency is a result of perfect monopoly power — the entire surplus goes to
the vacancy if there is no competition for the applicant it selects and to the worker if he
or she winds up having the monopoly power. The monopoly intuition does not require
that the labor market be large.
15do so. More fundamentally, even if a worker somehow knew that he or she
was the only candidate for a job, this wage determination protocol would not
survive if one allowed for competing mechanisms. The proposed mechanism
g i v e sa na p p l i c a n ta ne x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀo f
γ(θ;a)+( 1− γ(θ;a))(1 − p(θ;a)) = γ(θ;a)+( 1− γ(θ;a))w∗(θ;a).7
Note, however, that the proposed mechanism is equivalent in terms of ex-
p e c t e dp a y o ﬀt oo n ei nw h i c he a c hv a c a n c yp o s t sw∗(θ;a) and pays that
wage to its selected applicant unless that applicant has multiple oﬀers, in
which case the wage is bid up to one by Bertrand competition. However,
Proposition 2 tells us that the proposed mechanism is not an equilibrium.
If all vacancies were “in eﬀect” posting w∗(θ;a), i tw o u l db ei nt h ei n t e r -
est of individual vacancies to post a slightly lower wage. Although we do
not want to claim that it is “impossible” to ﬁnd a mechanism that could
implement the eﬃcient outcome, the above argument suggests that Propo-
sition 3 is more general than one might suspect at ﬁrst glance. Speciﬁcally,
this argument rules out any alternative mechanism that (i) has full ex post
competition (and, by equation (11), full ex post competition is required for
eﬃciency) and (ii) yields a positive expected payoﬀ when a worker receives
only one oﬀer.
4 Steady State
We now turn to steady-state analysis for a labor market with directed search
and multiple applications. We work with the limiting case in which u,v →∞
with v/u = θ and a ∈{ 2,...,A} ﬁxed. Since only the ratio of v to u matters
in the limiting case, we normalize the labor force to 1; thus, u is interpreted
as the unemployment rate.
In steady-state, workers ﬂow into employment with probability m(θ;a)
per period. We assume that matches break up exogenously with probability
δ, giving the countervailing ﬂow back into unemployment. Similarly, jobs
move from vacant to ﬁlled with probability
m(θ;a)
θ
and back again with
probability δ. Steady-state analysis thus allows us to endogenize vacancies
and unemployment. More importantly, moving to the steady state means
7An applicant with multiple oﬀers gets the full surplus (this occurs with probability
γ(θ;a)) as does an applicant who receives only one oﬀer but does so from a vacancy that
has no other applicants (this occurs with probability (1−γ(θ;a))(1−p(θ;a)). Otherwise,
the applicant gets nothing.
16that those unemployed who fail to ﬁnd an acceptable job in the current
period can wait and apply again in the future. In the case of a =1 , this is
not particularly interesting since, in equilibrium, there is no gain to waiting.
However, with multiple applications, the ability of the unemployed to hold
out for a situation in which vacancies engage in Bertrand competition for
their services, albeit at the cost of delay, implies a positive reservation wage.
This leads to a simple and appealing model in which labor market tightness
and the reservation wage are simultaneously determined. On the one hand,
the lower is the reservation wage of the unemployed, the more vacancies ﬁrms
want to create. On the other hand, as the labor market becomes tighter, i.e.,
as θ increases, the unemployed respond by increasing their reservation wage.
The steady-state equilibrium reservation wage is positive, thus suggesting
that moving to the steady-state might restore eﬃciency. Our ﬁnal result in
this section shows that this is not the case — there is still excessive vacancy
creation.
The analysis proceeds as follows. Suppose the unemployed set a reser-
vation wage R. With multiple applications, the wage-posting problem for a
vacancy is qualitatively the same as in the one-period game. Whatever com-
mon wage might be posted at other vacancies, each individual vacancy has
the incentive to undercut. In the one-period game, this implies a monop-
sony wage of w =0 ;in the steady state, this same mechanism implies a
dynamic monopsony wage of w = R.8 To avoid complicated dynamics, we
assume that a vacancy that fails to hire its candidate in period t cannot
carry its queue of remaining applicants (if any) over to the next period. As
a consequence, workers start with a new application round in each period
since their earlier applications are no longer on ﬁle. This implies that the
probability that an unemployed worker ﬁnds a job in any period and the
probability that he or she is hired at the competitive wage, conditional on
ﬁnding a job, are the same as in the single-period model; i.e., equations (1)
and (3) for m(θ;a) and γ(θ;a) continue to apply.
We begin by examining the value functions for jobs and for workers. A
job can be in one of three states — vacant, ﬁlled paying the competitive wage,
a n dﬁ l l e dp a y i n gR. Let V, J(1), and J(R) be the corresponding values. The
8We restrict our attention to stationary strategies (as do JKK in their dynamic exten-
sion). That is, we rule out reputation mechanisms that might avert bidding wars. Since
any two vacancies that might consider avoiding a bidding war today interact directly in
any future period with probability zero, this seems reasonable. We consider a mechanism
that rules out Bertrand competition in a static setting in Section 5.3 below.











Maintaining a vacancy entails a cost cv, w h i c hi si n c u r r e da tt h es t a r to f
each period. Moving to the end of the period, and thus discounting at
rate r, the vacancy has hired a worker with probability
m(θ;a)
θ
.W i t h
probability γ(θ;a), t h ew o r k e rw h ow a sh i r e dh a dh i so rh e rw a g eb i du p
to the competitive level, thus implying a value of J(1). With probability
1 − γ(θ;a) the worker was hired at w = R, thus implying a value of J(R).
Finally, with probability 1 −
m(θ;a)
θ
, the vacancy failed to hire, in which
case the value V is retained.
Free entry implies V =0so the analysis for vacancies remains the same;
that is, free entry turns the dynamic game into one that is essentially static
for vacancies. Given V =0 , there is no incentive for vacancies competing
for a worker to drop out of the Bertrand competition before the wage is
b i du pt ow =1(thus justifying the notation J(1)). This in turn implies
that we also have J(1) = 0. Inserting these equilibrium conditions into the
expression for V gives
m(θ;a)
θ
(1 − γ(θ;a))J(R)=cv(1 + r).


















A worker also passes through three states — unemployed, employed at





{m(θ;a)[γ(θ;a)N(1) + (1 − γ(θ;a))N(R)] + (1 − m(θ;a))U},
18where N(1) and N(R) are the values of employment at w =1and w = R,
respectively. These latter two values are in turn deﬁned by
N(1) = 1 +
1
1+r














Inserting these expressions into the expression for U and rearranging gives
the second steady-state equilibrium condition,
R =
m(θ;a)γ(θ;a)
r + δ + m(θ;a)γ(θ;a)
. (13)
The ﬁnal equation for the steady-state equilibrium is the standard ﬂow
(Beveridge curve) condition for unemployment. Since the labor force is





Equations (13) and (14) show that, as is common in this class of models,
once labor market tightness (θ) is determined, the other endogenous vari-
ables — in this case, R and u — are easily determined. Using equation (13)
to eliminate R from equation (12) gives the equation that determines the





r + δ + m(θ∗∗;a)γ(θ∗∗;a)
. (15)
Using our results on the properties of m(θ;a) and γ(θ;a), we can show that
the right-hand side of equation (15) equals
1
r + δ
as θ → 0, that it goes to
zero as θ →∞ , and that its derivative with respect to θ is negative for all




The natural next step is to compare equilibrium steady-state labor mar-
ket tightness with the constrained eﬃcient value of θ. The planner’s problem
19is to choose the level of labor market tightness that maximizes the discounted
value of output net of vacancy costs for an inﬁnitely-lived economy.9 That







(1 − us − cvθsus)
subject to
us+1 − us = δ(1 − us) −m(θs;a)us
with u0 given.







[(1 − us − cvθsus)+λs(us+1 − us − δ(1 − us)+m(θs;a)us)]
The necessary conditions for this problem evaluated at the steady state are
−cvu + λmθ(θ;a)u =0




r + δ + m(θ∗;a)
. (16)
Now we can compare the levels of labor market tightness implied by








Using equation (8), equation (16) can be rewritten as










As in the single-period analysis, θ∗ is the constrained eﬃcient level of labor
market tightness, i.e., the value of θ that solves equation (16), and θ∗∗ is the
equilibrium level of labor market tightness, i.e., the value of θ that solves
equation (15). Comparing equations (17) and (18) yields the following:
9We consider only stationary solutions, but this is not likely to be restrictive in our
model. There are two standard reasons why a nonstationary solution might be optimal.
First, as shown in Shimer and Smith (2001), a nonstationary solution can be optimal in
a matching model with two-sided heterogeneity when agents’ characteristics are comple-
ments in production. A nonstationary solution may also be optimal if there are increasing
returns to scale in the matching function. Neither of these features is present in our model.
20Proposition 4 Let u,v →∞with v/u = θ and a ∈{ 2,...,A} ﬁxed. Then
in steady state, θ∗∗ >θ ∗.
Proposition 4 indicates that, as in the single-period analysis, when the
unemployed make a ﬁxed number of multiple applications per period (a ∈
{2,...,A}), equilibrium is constrained ineﬃcient. Speciﬁcally, there is too
much vacancy creation. This result holds even though the ability of the
unemployed to reject oﬀers in favor of waiting for a more favorable outcome
in some future period implies a dynamic monopsony wage above the single-
period monopsony wage of zero. The intuition for the ineﬃciency result is
the same as in the static model. As before, the social beneﬁt of opening an
additional vacancy, the right-hand side of equation (18), is p(θ;a) times the
private beneﬁt, the right-hand side of equation (17).
5 Extensions and Robustness Checks
In this section, we focus on three simplifying assumptions that we made
in our basic model. These assumptions are: (i) that the number of appli-
cations sent out by each worker is a parameter of the search technology,
(ii) that each vacancy can process at most one applicant per period, and
(iii) that two or more vacancies competing for the same worker engage in
Bertrand competition for that worker’s services. Accordingly, we examine
what happens to our results if (i) the number of applications per worker is a
choice variable, (ii) each vacancy can process more than one applicant, and
(iii) vacancies pursue strategies that rule out Bertrand competition. In all
three robustness exercises, we conﬁrm our result that equilibria in models
of directed search with multiple applications are ineﬃcient.
5.1 Endogenous a
W eh a v ea s s u m e dt h a te a c hw o r k e rm a k e sa applications, where a ∈{ 1,2,...,A}
is exogenously given. Since the equilibrium level of labor market tightness
is eﬃcient when a =1but ineﬃcient when a ∈{ 2,...,A},i ti sn a t u r a lt o
ask whether — and under what circumstances — workers would choose to
make only one application or more than one. In addressing this question,
we consider only pure-strategy symmetric equilibria in application strate-
gies. That is, assuming that all other workers make a applications, under
what conditions (taking into account how ﬁrms react to all workers choosing
a) is it in the individual worker’s interest also to choose a?
21To make endogenizing a an interesting problem, there must be a cost
associated with applications, so we assume that each application costs ca to
submit. In the one-shot game, there are then only 2 exogenous parameters,
the cost of posting a vacancy,cv, and the cost of submitting an application,
ca. We need only consider 0 ≤ cv ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ ca ≤ 1 since worker output
equals 1 and if cv > 1, no ﬁrm would post a vacancy, and if ca > 1, no
worker would make an application. Thus for each (cv,c a) in the unit square
we can ask (i) what are the free-entry equilibrium values of θ and a and (ii)
what values of θ and a would a social planner choose?
We start with the equilibrium problem and ask: For what values of
(cv,c a) is a =1consistent with equilibrium? For what values of (cv,c a) is
a =2consistent with equilibrium? Etc. We address this problem numeri-
cally as follows.
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which all workers make a applica-
tions. Then, for each θ, we know what wage vacancies choose to post (from
equation (2) if a =1 ;zero if a ∈{ 2,...,A}), and we know m(θ;a).W ep i c k
a value of cv from a grid over (0,1). From the free-entry condition (equation
(6) if a =1 ;equation (7) otherwise), there is a corresponding implied value
of θ. We then ask, using the value of θ implied by the free-entry condition,
f o rw h a tv a l u e so fca is an individual worker’s expected payoﬀ maximized by
choosing to send out the same number of applications as all other workers
do? We answer this numerically by comparing the expected payoﬀ associated
with choosing a when all other workers also choose a with those associated
with choosing a − 1,a− 2,... and a +1 ,a+2 ,..., etc.10 For the particular
cv that we chose, this gives us a range of values for ca.W et h e nr e p e a tf o r
the next value of cv, etc. The outcome of this algorithm is the set of (cv,c a)
combinations in the unit square that are consistent with a pure-strategy
symmetric equilibrium in which all workers make a applications. We carry
o u tt h i sp r o c e s sf o raw i d er a n g eo fv a l u e sf o ra.
Next, we address the social planner’s problem. Given (cv,c a), the natural
social planner’s problem is
max
θ,a
m(θ;a) − cvθ − caa,
where θ ≥ 0 and a ∈{ 0,1,2,...}. We know this problem is concave in θ for a
given a. Thus, if (θ∗,a ∗) solves the social planner’s problem, we must have
cv = mθ(θ∗;a∗),
10This comparison can be carried out in a ﬁnite number of steps since the maximum
number of applications a worker might make is limited by the requirement that the total
cost of submitting applications be less than one.
22and θ∗ = θ∗(a∗;cv) has a unique solution. We can plug this back into
the social planner’s objective and maximize numerically with respect to a.
This gives a∗ (and θ∗)a sf u n c t i o n so f(cv,c a). We can then compare the
equilibrium unit square with the social planner unit square.
The qualitative results of this exercise are as follows. First, although
there are many parameter conﬁgurations for which the equilibrium number
of applications, a∗∗,e q u a l s1, this outcome requires relatively high values of
ca. Second, the equilibrium number of applications increases as ca falls (as
one would expect). Third, there are parameter conﬁgurations that admit
multiple equilibria. This reﬂects a complementarity between workers’ and
ﬁrms’ strategies. For example, if all workers choose a =1 , then vacancies
post a positive wage, w(θ;1)> 0. F o rs o m ev a l u e so fθ (equivalently, for some
values of cv) it is not worthwhile for workers to submit a second application.
On the other hand, if all workers choose a =2 , then w =0 , and it cannot
be worthwhile for a worker to deviate to a =1 . Fourth, there are many
parameter conﬁgurations for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
exists. One parameter region in which this is the case is the set of (cv,c a)
combinations in which individual workers would prefer not to send out any
applications when all other workers choose a =1 . This occurs when both cv
and ca are relatively high. There are, however, other (cv,c a) combinations
for which no symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium exists. Fifth, for relatively
low values of ca, there are parameter regions with unique equilibria at a∗∗ =
2,a ∗∗ =3 , etc.
In the parameter regions in which a symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium
(or equilibria) exists, we ﬁnd a∗∗ ≥ a∗. Speciﬁcally, there are parameter
conﬁgurations for which a∗ = a∗∗ =1(where a∗∗ =1may either be unique
or one of two or more equilibrium possibilities). However, when a∗∗ ≥ 2,
we ﬁnd a∗∗ >a ∗. This occurs when cv and ca are low relative to the output
produced by a match. That is, for what we view as reasonable values of cv
and ca, the equilibrium number of applications exceeds the socially optimal
value. The reason is simply that individual workers, when deciding how
many applications to submit, fail to take into account the externality they
impose on other workers. The countervailing eﬀect that one might expect —
that an increase in worker applications should make it easier for ﬁrms to ﬁll
their vacancies — is not suﬃcient to oﬀset this externality and, indeed, may
even be negative because of the coordination failure among vacancies.
Finally, endogenizing a does not aﬀect our basic result that, while di-
rected search with one application always leads to the eﬃcient level of labor
market tightness, this is not the case with multiple applications. For (cv,c a)
combinations such that a∗ = a∗∗ =1 , we, of course, have θ∗ = θ∗∗. For
23almost all parameter conﬁgurations for which a∗∗ >a ∗, we ﬁnd θ∗∗ >θ ∗ as
we did before. There is a small set of parameter conﬁgurations, however,
for which θ∗∗ <θ ∗.11 This appears at ﬁrst glance to be inconsistent with
Proposition 3, but note that in that Proposition, we imposed the restriction
that a∗ = a∗∗.
The bottom line of this robustness exercise is that when a is endoge-
nous and when workers choose a>1, equilibrium may be ineﬃcient in two
w a y s . T h e r ea r ea l w a y st o om a n ya p p l i c a t i o n sp e rw o r k e ra n dl a b o rm a r -
ket tightness is generally not at the level the social planner would choose.
The assumption that a is an exogenous parameter of the search technology,
which we made in order to make our basic model as transparent as possible,
is not driving our results on the ineﬃciency eﬀects of multiple applications.
5.2 Shortlisting
Our ineﬃciency result is based on a double coordination failure. Not only are
workers unable to coordinate in terms of where they send their applications,
b u tv a c a n c i e sa r eu n a b l et oc o o r d i n a t ei nt e r m so fw h i c ha p p l i c a n t st h e yt r y
to hire. In our basic model, we represented the coordination failure among
vacancies in a clean but extreme way. A natural question is the extent to
which our results depend on our assumption that each vacancy can pursue
at most one applicant.
To address this question, we now consider a version of the basic one-shot
model in which each vacancy can make up to two oﬀers. Speciﬁcally, we
assume that vacancies form “short lists” as follows. If two or more workers
apply to a vacancy, the vacancy selects two applicants at random and rejects
the others. It selects one of its chosen applicants to receive its ﬁrst-round
oﬀer. The other applicant, if she is not hired by another vacancy in the
ﬁrst round, gets a second-round oﬀer in the event that the vacancy doesn’t
hire in the ﬁrst round. If only one worker applies to a vacancy, then that
worker gets the vacancy’s ﬁrst-round oﬀer. To keep the algebra as simple as
possible, we analyze this model for the case of a =2 .
This extension makes our model far more diﬃcult. The basic reason
is that when a worker thinks about applying to a vacancy that is deviat-
11To understand why this can happen, recall that m(θ;a) is decreasing in a for suf-
ﬁciently high a. Reducing the matching rate hurts both workers and vacancies. When
workers choose a
∗∗ > 1, the planner can improve on the equilibrium allocation by reduc-
ing a. When m(θ;a) is decreasing in a , the reduction in a increases the matching rate and
can, for some parameter values, increase the marginal beneﬁt of opening a vacancy, i.e.,
mθ(θ;a), suﬃciently so that the social planner would also raise θ. This happens despite
the fact that were a ﬁxed at either a
∗ or a
∗∗, the social planner would want to decrease θ.
24ing from the putative equilibrium wage, the indiﬀerence condition becomes
considerably more complicated. A worker’s application strategy aﬀects the
probabilities of being placed on 0, 1, or 2 short lists; the worker could be
in ﬁrst or second place on these short lists, etc. In addition, an interme-
d i a t ew a g ea r i s e si nt h i sm o d e l .C o n s i d e rt w ov a c a n c i e sc o m p e t i n gf o rt h e
same applicant in the ﬁrst round. If either or both of these vacancies has a
second-round candidate, then Bertrand competition in the ﬁrst round stops
before the competitive level.
Our analysis of shortlisting follows the same road map that we used
for our basic model. We ﬁrst derive the matching probability, assuming a
symmetric equilibrium posted wage. Second, taking θ as given, we derive
the symmetric equilibrium wage-posting strategy for vacancies. Finally, we
characterize the free-entry equilibrium level of labor market tightness and
the corresponding constrained eﬃcient level and compare the two. The
central result of our analysis still holds — the equilibrium level of θ exceeds
the eﬃcient level.
Because the details of the shortlisting extension are tedious, we present
the derivations in the ﬁrst section of the web supplements to this paper.
Here, in the text, we simply summarize and comment on our results.
We begin with the matching probability. Assuming the existence of a
symmetric equilibrium posted wage, that is, assuming that all vacancies are
equally attractive ex ante, the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job is
m(θ)=1− (1 − q1)2(1 − q2)2,
where q1 is the probability that an application leads to a ﬁrst-round oﬀer
and q2 is the probability that an application leads to a second-round oﬀer
given that it does not generate a ﬁrst-round oﬀer. An explanation of the
form of m(θ) and expressions for q1 and q2 are given in Section 1 of the web
supplements to this paper. Note that the probability that an application
leads to a ﬁrst-round oﬀer is the same as the probability that the application
would have generated an oﬀer had there been only one round; i.e., q1 = q
(from the basic model). The obvious result thus follows; namely, for each
value of θ, shortlisting increases the probability that a worker ﬁnds a job.
From the social planner’s perspective, the only eﬀect of shortlisting is to
change the form of m(θ). The eﬀect on equilibrium is, however, much more
complicated. For low values of θ, the equilibrium analysis is qualitatively
similar to the one we carried out for our basic model. All vacancies post
a wage of zero. Bertrand competition for an applicant who has two ﬁrst-
round oﬀers either drives the wage to the competitive level (if neither of
25the competing vacancies has a second-round candidate) or to the interme-
diate wage (if at least one of the vacancies has a second-round candidate).
An applicant who, having failed to get any ﬁrst-round oﬀers, gets a single
second-round oﬀer receives the monopsony wage (zero). An applicant who
gets two second-round oﬀers receives a wage of one.
F o rh i g h e rv a l u e so fθ (the cutoﬀ value is approximately θ =0 .42),
there are multiple equilibria. For example, when θ =1 , any wage in the
interval [0.20,0.23] (approximately) is consistent with equilibrium. Multiple
equilibria arise because the derivative of expected proﬁt with respect to
the potential deviant’s wage is discontinuous at the equilibrium wage. The
reason that w =0is not an equilibrium posted wage for higher values of θ
has to do with the change in application incentives implied by shortlisting.
In our basic model, a worker whose application is accepted by more than
one vacancy necessarily receives a wage of one, and workers are willing to
a p p l yt ov a c a n c i e sp o s t i n gw =0in hopes of hitting the jackpot. With
shortlisting, however, a worker can wind up with the posted wage even if
both of her applications are accepted — speciﬁcally, if she is ﬁrst on one
v a c a n c y ’ ss h o r tl i s ta n ds e c o n do nt h eo t h e r ’ s .( W h e nθ is low, w =0arises
even with shortlisting due to a lack of competition among vacancies.)
Whether θ is low, so w =0is the unique posted wage, or θ is high,
so there are multiple equilibria, workers can receive three diﬀerent wages
— the posted wage, the intermediate wage, and the competitive wage. The
intermediate wage, s, is determined by
1 − s =( 1− q1)(1 − q2)(1 − w).
The left-hand side of this expression is the proﬁt that a vacancy realizes
if it hires its ﬁrst-round candidate at wage s. The right-hand side is the
expected proﬁt for a vacancy that received two applications should it choose
to proceed to the second round. With probability 1−q1 the vacancy’s second-
place candidate will still be available after the ﬁrst round. Conditional on
still being available, this candidate will fail to get a competing second round
oﬀer with probability 1 −q2. The vacancy then realizes a proﬁt of 1 − w.
For each value of θ, the next step is to compute the expected proﬁt of
a vacancy, say π(θ). When there are multiple equilibria, we use the highest
possible equilibrium wage. At this wage, π(θ) is at its lowest possible level;
hence the incentive to create vacancies is as small as possible. The free-entry
equilibrium value of labor market tightness, θ∗∗, is determined by
cv = π(θ∗∗),
26which is analogous to equation (7) in our basic model. The eﬃcient value
o fl a b o rm a r k e tt i g h t n e s s ,θ∗, is determined by
cv = m (θ∗),
precisely as in the basic model. The only eﬀect of shortlisting is to change
the form of m(·).
It is straightforward to compute m (θ) and π(θ) numerically. Both of
these functions are positive and decreasing in θ, and π(θ) >m  (θ) for each
θ>0. Equivalently, θ∗∗ >θ ∗. T h a ti s ,t h ec e n t r a lr e s u l to fo u rb a s i cm o d e l ,
namely, that there is excessive vacancy creation in equilibrium, continues to
hold when we extend our model to allow for shortlisting.
The fact that shortlisting reduces matching frictions does not necessarily
mean that shortlisting makes equilibrium more eﬃcient in the sense that
θ∗∗ “ g e t sc l o s e rt o ”θ∗. Shortlisting aﬀects both the social planner’s problem
and the market outcome so that both θ∗ and θ∗∗ change. The fact that
θ∗∗ >θ ∗ continues to hold when we allow for shortlisting suggests that
our result on the ineﬃciency of directed search equilibrium when workers
make multiple applications is robust to our assumption that vacancies can
consider at most one application. Even if vacancies could process all their
applicants, some vacancies that receive applications would nonetheless lose
all their candidates to rival vacancies. Shortlisting reduces the coordination
problem among vacancies but does not eliminate it.
5.3 Oﬀer-Beating Strategies
In our basic model, we assumed that if a worker receives oﬀers from two
or more vacancies, those vacancies then engage in Bertrand competition for
the worker’s services. Although the Bertrand assumption is standard in the
literature, it can be debated in our environment. A vacancy that is about
to lose a worker to a rival should be indiﬀerent between letting the worker
take the other job versus entering into Bertrand competition. After all, both
policies, conceding or competing, lead to the same zero-proﬁt outcome.
A natural alternative is to assume that each vacancy announces a wage
and then commits not to engage in ex post bidding. However, as discussed
in footnote 1, in this case, there is no equilibrium with a common posted
wage. Moreover, simply assuming commitment is unsatisfactory because if
all other vacancies were to follow the commitment strategy, any vacancy
whose candidate has multiple oﬀers could do better by deviating from that
strategy and oﬀering slightly more. This leads us to consider oﬀer-beating
strategies.
27We deﬁne such strategies as follows:
1. Post w.
2. If all other vacancies pursuing the same applicant post w or less, con-
tinue to oﬀer w.
3. If at least one other vacancy pursuing the same applicant posts w  >w
or makes a counteroﬀer w  >w , make a counteroﬀer above w . If one or
more rivals makes a counteroﬀer to the counteroﬀer, respond in kind;
i.e., engage in Bertrand competition.
Of course, these strategies only are relevant when workers make more than
one application.
Oﬀer-beating strategies are analogous to the price-beating strategies that
have been used in the industrial organization literature to rule out Bertrand
competition in prices. Price-beating strategies are sometimes used in that
literature as a foundation for “kinked demand curves” (e.g., Tirole 1988, pp.
243-45). Typically, there is a continuum of price-beating Nash equilibria —
absent any consideration of equilibrium reﬁnements, there is a continuum of
prices at which the demand curve can kink.
We begin our analysis of oﬀer-beating equilibria taking θ as given. We
ﬁrst show that for each θ, there is a continuum of oﬀer-beating Nash equi-
libria. We then show that when we endogenize θ, all of these equilibria are
ineﬃcient. The details of our analysis and the proofs of our results are given
in Section 2 of the web supplements to this paper. Speciﬁcally, we prove the
following:




1 − e−a/θ. There exists a continuum of sym-
metric oﬀer-beating Nash equilibria indexed by w ∈ [0,w(θ;a)].
Proposition 6 There is excessive vacancy creation in any symmetric oﬀer-
beating Nash equilibrium.
This indicates that the ineﬃciency associated with multiple applications is
n o ta na r t i f a c to fex post Bertrand competition for applicants.
To gain further insight into the ineﬃciency result in our basic model, it
is useful to examine why oﬀer-beating equilibria are also ineﬃcient. Oﬀer-
beating strategies lead to implicit collusion among vacancies. This collusion
shuts down all ex post competition, that is, the competition that can occur
28after workers make their applications and vacancies select their candidates.
Oﬀer-beating strategies can also shut down ex ante competition among va-
cancies, that is, the competition among vacancies to attract applicants, to a
greater or lesser extent, ranging from a complete absence of ex ante compe-
tition when w =0to full ex ante competition when w = w(θ;a). Note that
w(θ;a)=w∗, the wage that a social planner would set if vacancies engaged
in Bertrand competition rather than following oﬀer-beating strategies. That
is, were there full ex post competition, the social planner would want to im-
plement full ex ante competition. If vacancies follow oﬀer-beating strategies,
the social planner would prefer a wage above w(θ;a) to compensate for the
lack of ex post competition. Absent ex post competition, the decision to
post a vacancy neglects the externality that arises when a vacancy hires a
worker with one or more other oﬀers.
In our model, Bertrand competition fully implements ex post competition
but at the cost of eliminating ex ante competition. Oﬀer-beating strategies
have the potential to achieve full ex ante competition but by design shut
down ex post competition. The lesson we draw is that in directed search
models in which workers make a ﬁnite number of multiple applications and
vacancies post wages to attract workers, there is a fundamental tradeoﬀ
between ex ante and ex post competition.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we construct an equilibrium search model of a large labor
market in which workers, after observing all posted wages, submit a ﬁxed
number of applications, a ∈{ 1,...A}, to the vacancies that they ﬁnd most at-
tractive. We derive the symmetric equilibrium matching probability and the
common posted wage. When a =1 , o u ra n a l y s i si sal a r g el a b o rm a r k e tv e r -
sion of BSW. However, when a ∈{ 2,...A}, i.e., when workers make multiple
applications, the symmetric equilibrium of our model is radically diﬀerent.
With multiple applications, the matching probability in our model reﬂects
the interplay of two coordination failures — an urn-ball failure among work-
ers and a multiple-application failure among vacancies. In addition, when
workers make more than one application, all vacancies post the monopsony
wage, but there is dispersion in wages paid. Workers who receive only one
job oﬀer are paid the monopsony wage, but those who receive multiple of-
fers get the competitive wage. When workers make a single application or
when they apply to an arbitrarily large number of vacancies, equilibrium
is constrained eﬃcient; but when workers make a ﬁnite number of multiple
29applications, too many vacancies are posted. These results, both positive
and normative, carry over from the single-period model to a steady-state
framework and they are robust with respect to reasonable variations in our
key assumptions.
Directed search is an appealing way to model equilibrium unemploy-
ment and wage dispersion. In reality, workers do direct their applications to
attractive vacancies, but unemployment nonetheless persists as a result of
coordination failures on both sides of the labor market. In addition, those
workers who are lucky enough to generate competition for their services
do in fact have their wages bid up. The contribution of our paper is to
show that these realistic features can be captured in a tractable equilibrium
model and, more importantly, that when these features are incorporated,
equilibrium is not constrained eﬃcient.
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31Appendices
A Proof of Proposition 1
We now sketch the proof of Proposition 1. The full proof is given in Albrecht
et. al. (2004). We compute m(θ;a) as follows. The probability that a worker
ﬁnds a job is one minus the probability that he or she gets no job oﬀers.
Consider a worker who applies to a vacancies, and let the random variables
X1,X 2,...,Xa be the number of competitors that he or she has at vacancy 1,
vacancy 2, ..., vacancy a. The probability that the worker gets no job oﬀers










P[X1 = x1,X 2 = x2,...Xa = xa].
In general, the random variables X1,X 2,...,Xa are not independent, making
the computation of the joint probability a diﬃcult one. (Albrecht et. al.
2004 and Philip 2003 give an expression for the joint probability.) The
intuition for dependence is straightforward. Consider, for example, a labor
market in which u and v are small and in which each worker makes a =2
applications. Then, if a worker has relatively many competitors at the ﬁrst
vacancy to which he or she applies, it is more likely that his or her second
application has relatively few competitors. The key to Proposition 1 is
that this dependence vanishes in the limit. In the limit, the fact that a
worker has an unexpectedly large number of competitors at one vacancy
says nothing about the number of competitors he or she faces elsewhere.
The joint probability then equals the product of the marginals, and the
probability that a worker gets at least one oﬀer can be computed as 1 − ￿￿ x
x+1P[X = x]
￿a
. As u,v →∞with v/u = θ, the number of competitors
an applicant faces at any particular vacancy, X, converges in distribution to
aP o i s s o n(
a
θ
) random variable. A straightforward computation then gives
equation (1).
If a =1 , there is no problem of dependence. The number of competitors
that a worker has at the vacancy to which he or she applies is a bin(u−1, 1
v)



























With a change in notation, this result is the same as the one given in BSW.
Taking the limit of this matching probability as u,v →∞with v/u = θ
32gives m(θ;1) = θ(1 − e−1/θ), as equation (1) implies. The case of a = v
is the polar opposite. In this case, X1 = X2 = ... = Xa = u − 1 with
probability one, so the probability a worker gets an oﬀer is 1−(u−1
u )v, as in
JKK. Taking the limit as u,v →∞with v/u = θ gives
m(θ)=1− e−θ.
T h es a m ee x p r e s s i o nc a nb ed e r i v e db yt a k i n gt h el i m i to fm(θ;a) as a →∞
in equation (1).
B Proof of Proposition 2
As discussed in the text, we need to show that when a =1 , the wage
w(θ;1) has the property that if all vacancies, with the possible exception
of a potential deviant (D), post that wage, then it is also in D’s interest to
post w(θ;1).W h e n a ∈{ 2,...,A}, we need to show that no matter what
common wage is posted by other vacancies, it is always in D’s interest to
undercut, thus driving w(θ;a) to zero.
Suppose D posts a wage of w  and that each nondeviant vacancy (N)
posts w. Then D’s expected proﬁt is
π(w ;w)=( 1 −w )P[D gets at least one application]P[selected applicant has no other oﬀer]
Let k be the probability that any one worker applies to D. In symmetric
equilibrium, k must be the same for all workers. As u →∞ , k must go to
zero; otherwise, any applicant to D would have an inﬁnity of competitors
a n dt h e r e f o r ew o u l dg e tt h ej o ba tDw i t hp r o b a b i l i t yz e r o .W el e tu →∞
and k → 0 in such a way that ku = ξ stays constant; thus, in a large
labor market, the number of applications sent to D is a Poisson (ξ) random
variable. We therefore have
P[Dg e t sa tl e a s to n ea p p l i c a t i o n ]=1− e−ξ.
The parameter ξ depends on w  and w through an indiﬀerence condition,
which we develop below. Finally, the last term on the right-hand side of
π(w ;w) can be written as
P[selected applicant has no other oﬀer]=( 1− q)a−1,
where q i st h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a ta n yo n ea p p l i c a t i o nt oa nNv a c a n c yl e a d s
to an oﬀer. We thus have
π(w ;w)=( 1− w )(1 − e−ξ)(1 − q)a−1.
33The parameter ξ determines the probability (call it qD)t h a taw o r k e r












To understand this expression, note that (i) a worker who has x competitors
at D gets the oﬀer from D with probability
1
x +1
and (ii) the number of
competitors faced by a worker who applies to D is Poisson (ξ). Similarly,













Note that q was also deﬁned in the discussion following Proposition 1 and
does not depend on w .
We now develop the indiﬀerence condition, which deﬁnes ξ as a function
of w  given w and θ. Each worker must be indiﬀerent between sending all a
applications to N vacancies versus sending 1 application to D and the other
a−1 to N vacancies. The expected payoﬀ from sending all applications to N
vacancies depends on neither ξ nor w  and can thus be treated as a constant.
The expected payoﬀ from sending one application to D and the others to N
vacancies does, of course, depend on ξ and w .
The possible payoﬀs for a worker who sends 1 application to D and the
other a − 1 applications to N vacancies are
(i) 1 if 2 or more applications are accepted.
This occurs with probability
qD(1 − (1 − q)a−1)+( 1− qD)(1 −(1 − q)a−1 −(a − 1)q(1 − q)a−2)
=1 − (1 − q)a−1 − (1 − qD)(a −1)q(1 − q)a−2.
(ii) w  if only the application to D is successful.
This occurs with probability qD(1 − q)a−1.
(iii) w if the application to D is unsuccessful and only one application to N
is successful.
This occurs with probability (1 − qD)(a −1)q(1 − q)a−2.
(iv) 0 if no applications are successful.
34This occurs with probability (1 − qD)(1 − q)a−1.
The expected payoﬀ for a worker who sends 1 application to D and a−1 to
Ni st h u s
1−(1−q)a−1−(1−qD)(a−1)q(1−q)a−2+w qD(1−q)a−1+w(1−qD)(a−1)q(1−q)a−2.
Equating the two expected payoﬀs implicitly deﬁnes ξ(w ;w,θ). Diﬀeren-




1 − e−ξ − ξe−ξ
ξ2 ,
and substituting for qD and q gives
dξ
dw  =
ξ(1 − e−ξ)(1 − θ
a(1 − e−a/θ))
(1 −e−ξ − ξe−ξ)
￿
(a − 1)θ
a(1 − e−a/θ)(1 − w)+w (1 − θ
a(1 − e−a/θ))
￿
Since 1 − e−x − xe−x > 0 for all x>0 and 1 ≥ w, we have
dξ
dw  > 0 (as
expected) and
d2ξ
dw 2 < 0.
T u r n i n gb a c kt oD ’ so p t i m i z a t i o np r o b l e m ,π(w ;w) is proportional to
(1 − w )(1 − e−ξ). Maximizing with respect to w , the ﬁrst-order (Kuhn-
Tucker) condition is
−(1 − e−ξ)+( 1− w )e−ξ dξ
dw  ≤ 0 with equality if w  > 0.
If there is an interior solution, the second-order condition holds.
We are interested in the possibility of an interior solution at w  = w.






Next consider the case of a ∈{ 2,...,A}. Substituting the expression
for
dξ
dw  into the Kuhn-Tucker condition and evaluating at w  = w,w h e r e
ξ = a/θ, gives
(1 − w)ξe−ξ(1 − 1
ξ(1 − e−ξ))
(1 − e−ξ − ξe−ξ)
￿
(a − 1)1
ξ(1 − e−ξ)(1 − w)+w(1 − 1
ξ(1 − e−ξ))
￿ ≤ 1
This can be rewritten as
(1−w)e−ξ(ξ2−ξ(1−e−ξ)) ≤
￿
1 − e−ξ −ξe−ξ
￿￿




ξ2e−ξ +( a − 2)ξe−ξ(1 − e−ξ) − (a − 1)2(1 − e−ξ)2
(1 − e−ξ)
≤ w(ξ−a(1−e−ξ)+(a−1)2ξ(1−e−ξ)2).
Only a corner solution exists with w(θ;a)=0if this is a strict inequality.
To show that this inequality is in fact strict when a ∈{ 2,...,A}, we show
that the RHS of the above expression is positive for any w>0 and for all
ξ = a/θ > 0, while the LHS is negative. Note ﬁrst that as ξ → 0, the









−e−ξ((1 − e−ξ)2((a − 1)(a − 2) + ξ(a − 2)) + (1 − e−ξ − ξ)2
(1 − e−ξ)2 ,
which is negative for a ∈{ 2,...,A}. Thus, in this case, we have a corner
solution with w(θ;a)=0 .
Finally to derive γ(θ;a), note that in symmetric equilibrium qD ≡ q =
θ
a(1 − e−a/θ). Af r a c t i o n1 − (1 − q)a of all workers get a job. A fraction
1 − (1 − q)a − a(1 − q)a−1 of all workers receive multiple oﬀers. Thus, a
fraction
1 − (1 −q)a −a(1 −q)a−1
1 − (1 − q)a
of the workers who ﬁnd a job receive the competitive wage. Substituting for
q gives equation (4). QED
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